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SOME SIMPLE OBSERVATIONS ON THE
REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM
jan kregel
A New International Reserve Currency?
The rapid spread and global dimensions of the current financial crisis have drawn attention to the
need for reform of the international financial system forged in 1944 at Bretton Woods. Both the
G-20 and the United Nations have made formal proposals in this regard. In recent discussions,
most of the attention has been focused on the role of the U.S. dollar in the international system,
and the need to find a substitute that would better preserve the purchasing power of foreign cur-
rency reserves; in particular, those held by developing countries. 
These discussions seem to ignore two basic criticisms, made by John Maynard Keynes and
Robert Triffin, of the functioning of the existing monetary system. These criticisms suggest that
the basic problem with the system is not the particular asset that serves as the international cur-
rency but rather the operation of the adjustment mechanism for dealing with global imbalances.
They also suggest that the recommendations contained in the Report of the Commission of Experts
of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary
and Financial System need to be interpreted as an integrated whole.1
In the Beginning: The Gold Exchange Standard
The 20th-century gold exchange standard was based on an international system of free exchange—of
goods, services, and capital. In such conditions, it was presumed that competition among countries
would support the law of one price for all goods traded in global markets. When this was not thecase, international arbitrage would take place. If the gold price of
goods were below that prevailing in other countries, there would
be an incentive to exchange gold for goods and to export those
goods to foreign markets where the gold price was higher. Private
individuals seeking to maximize profits would engage in interna-
tional exchange that would result in an equivalent gold price for
similar goods in all countries. A corollary of this system of arbi-
trage was the elimination of trade imbalances, as surplus coun-
tries would be accumulating gold. This was presumed to bring
about a rise in the gold price of domestic goods, reducing their
competitiveness in the global marketplace. Gold exports would
replace goods exports, and the surplus would be reduced until
gold prices were brought back to international levels and the
external accounts returned to balance. Another corollary was that
the purchasing power of private savings would be stable on aver-
age over time, whether invested in domestic or in foreign cur-
rency. The stability of the purchasing power of savings was a result
of the operation of the international adjustment mechanism
rather than some quality or value inherent in gold itself.
Keynes and the Barbarous Relic
Keynes criticized the international gold-standard system
because the mechanism for addressing imbalances was nor-
mally not through arbitrage to eliminate price differentials but
rather through adjustments in the level of activity—particu-
larly in the level of employment. Further, he noted that this
quantity adjustment process tended to be asymmetric. Since
deficit countries that experienced a gold outflow could run out
of gold before the price arbitrage process was operative, they
would have to take measures to stem the outflow of gold, usually
through an increase in interest rates, a cutback in domestic financ-
ing for investment, and a reduction of incomes that would lead to
a fall in the demand for imports. This would improve the external
balance, but at the cost of a lower level of output and employ-
ment. Surplus countries, on the other hand, could simply let
their surpluses accumulate without allowing the expansion in
the gold supply to induce changes in their domestic policies. If
the only adjustment in the international system were a reduc-
tion in activity, this would lead to a tendency for global demand
to be consistently below that necessary to allow full employ-
ment. This would constrain the ability of countries that chose
to implement full employment policies, if other countries
elected not to adopt such policies as well. 
Keynes was especially concerned that the active policies he
had proposed to support the level of employment in response
to the Great Depression would be stymied by the actions of
countries that believed the appropriate response to financial
crisis was to increase saving by cutting government expendi-
tures. There was a second asymmetry involved, since the costs
of quantity adjustment were borne by labor (i.e., the loss of
employment reduced wage incomes), while the purchasing power
of private savings was preserved—or, in the case of a reduction
in activity leading to deflation, augmented. There was also an
asymmetric relationship between debtors and creditors (in favor
of the latter) that made recovery more difficult.
To resolve the problem of asymmetric adjustment, Keynes
recommended the creation of an International Clearing Union,
with temporary payment imbalances settled by means of a
notional unit of account that could not be traded in private
markets. However, it was not the proposal to replace gold with a
notional unit of account that was critical. It was that member
governments would agree to implement coordinated symmetric
adjustment policies, either by rule or by mutual consultation,
with policy actions taken by both deficit and surplus countries—
the reduced activity in the former to be balanced by the expan-
sion of activity in the latter in order to keep global demand
unchanged. The costs of adjustment would then be borne equally
by all countries and by capital and labor, and would allow coun-
tries to pursue national policies of full employment if they chose. 
Keynes’s proposed system did not envisage private cur-
rency trading or the presence of large international capital
flows, intermediated by private financial institutions, to finance
external imbalances. The simple reason was that, not only could
such flows be destabilizing (as had been the case in the interwar
period), but they could also allow imbalances to increase with-
out limit as long as countries could borrow in private markets.
This would put the size of imbalances and their adjustment in
the hands of private bankers rather than in the hands of govern-
ment policymakers.  
Under Keynes’s proposal for reform of the gold-exchange
standard, the maintenance of purchasing power depended on an
adjustment mechanism that constrained the size of imbalances
and thus preserved the exchange rates between national curren-
cies and the notional unit of account. But there is no automatic
mechanism that ensures this result, nor any mechanism that
ensures full employment. It is the result of coordinated policy
action taken mutually by members of the clearing union.
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The Triffin Dilemma
In any event, Keynes’s proposal was not adopted. Instead, the
dollar was inserted into the system in place of gold by pegging
the dollar price of gold and the parity of all other currencies to
the dollar. This dollar-exchange standard, adopted at Bretton
Woods, possessed an additional difficulty identified by Triffin.
He observed that, irrespective of whether the dollar (or any
national currency) playing the role of international reserve cur-
rency were fixed in terms of gold, global confidence in its value
would eventually erode. This was because the asymmetric adjust-
ment that Keynes had noted with respect to the gold standard
would still exist for all countries—except for the country whose
national currency served as the international means of payment
and store of value. Thus, surplus countries, without the neces-
sity of introducing adjustment policy, would increase their
holdings of the national currency (the dollar), and all countries
seeking increased international liquidity would do so as well.
This would lead to ever-increasing deficits for the country issu-
ing the reserve currency—in the Bretton Woods system, the
United States. If the currency were linked to gold, its outstand-
ing international currency issue would soon exceed the gold sup-
ply on which it was based, leading to an inability to meet the
commitment to fix the exchange value of the currency in gold.
This is the dilemma in the dollar exchange system that was noted
by Triffin in the 1950s and which occurred in the 1960s. 
In this system, there may be a tendency to support global
aggregate demand if the country issuing the reserve currency is
willing to accept the increasing current account deficits required
to satisfy the growing demand for global liquidity. But the Triffin
dilemma will always be present, and at some stage there will be
a crisis caused by a collapse in international confidence in the
currency’s value and calls for a substitute currency.
The opposite would be the case if the country were to pur-
sue a policy of external balance, or of building external savings
or following a strategy of export-led growth. This was more or
less the case of the United States in the period of dollar short-
ages after the war, and of Germany in the European Monetary
System before the creation of the euro. In these cases, the prob-
lem was the lack of global liquidity caused by excess savings
held by the country issuing the reserve currency—the problem
that special drawing rights, or SDRs, were originally meant to
resolve. However, by the time they were created, the problem
was an excess of dollar liquidity, a problem that SDRs were
unable to solve.
A version of the Triffin dilemma is also present in a system
in which the national currency serving as the international
means of payment is not fixed in terms of gold or any other
physical asset. In this case, its value in terms of other currencies
is dependent on the willingness of surplus countries to hold the
currency. In simple terms, once the link to gold is broken, the
system becomes a Ponzi scheme in which the external value of
the international currency is determined by the demand for
reserves and liquidity by other countries. Thus, the ultimate
value of the international currency lies in its purchasing power
over the goods and services of the issuing country.  If foreign
holders are not willing to purchase the country’s exports, then
the value of the currency will decline until the price of its exports
becomes sufficiently attractive. In contrast to the gold standard,
the price adjustment mechanism here functions through changes
in the international value of the currency—the effect of the
exchange rate adjustment on the relative prices of goods and on
the capital value of international reserve holdings. The latter
represents the loss in purchasing power that has become the
center of attention in recent discussions about reforming the
international financial system.   
Finally, in all of these different forms of the international
financial system, the stability of the purchasing power of the
reserve currency is inherently linked to the operation of an
adjustment mechanism that eliminates international imbal-
ances, either automatically or through a coordinated policy
mechanism. The question of stable purchasing power would
thus appear to have little to do with what asset actually serves as
the international reserve currency.
A New International Reserve Currency?
The demand for reform of the financial system has not focused
on the current system’s inability to support global full employ-
ment. Rather, it concerns the dollar’s loss of international pur-
chasing power and its substitution by an international reserve
currency that is not a national currency. Some have suggested
the use of the SDR as a substitute for the dollar. However, as
long as the SDR remains a basket of national currencies, of fixed
or flexible proportions, it cannot resolve the problem—
although it may, through diversification, reduce the volatility of
the international reserve currency’s purchasing power. It should
be noted that this diversification could always be achieved with-
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diversification. This problem might be avoided through a fiat
issue of SDRs or creation of a truly supranational currency. But,
aside from political and other difficulties, this would also
require international coordination on the means and control of
its supply, as well as a mechanism to coordinate and manage the
adjustment of imbalances. 
Changing the international currency does not provide a
solution to the problem of the declining value of accumulated
surpluses in the form of reserves, which is caused by the absence
of an automatic adjustment mechanism that is compatible with
the full utilization of global resources. One attempt to resolve
this problem was the proposal of a commodity reserve currency,
which was widely discussed in the postwar period; though it had
the support of economists as diverse as Keynes and Friedrich
Hayek, the United Nations, and legendary hedge fund manager
Benjamin Graham, it was never tested. The basic idea was that
an increase in the demand for the international commodity
currency would precipitate an increase in the demand for com-
modities produced by developing countries, so that symmetry
would be automatic.
From this point of view, the question of preserving the
value of accumulated reserves from external surpluses should
rather be seen as the overvaluation of those surpluses or the
inappropriate distribution of that value between the support of
employment and the defense of capital values, or between credi-
tors and debtors. For example, in the case of China, the feared
decline in the value of its reserves through depreciation of the
dollar would already have been eliminated as a possibility if an
automatic adjustment process had been in effect, achieved
through a reduction in domestic income and employment or an
adjustment in the exchange rate.The introduction of the SDR or
other alternative currency will not protect the value of dollar
reserve holdings accumulated when the dollar is overvalued rel-
ative to what is required for external equilibrium.
How Do the U.N. Commission Recommendations
Deal with the Problem?
It is in this framework that the U.N. Commission recommenda-
tions are to be interpreted. The basic point of the analysis in the
Commission’s report is that the international system suffers
from an inherent tendency toward deficient aggregate demand.
This is a reflection of the asymmetry in the international adjust-
ment mechanism mentioned above. This tendency has only been
checked in recent times by anomalous developments in the U.S.
financial system that allowed household balance sheets to offset
an increasingly inequitable domestic distribution of income and
deficient demand in the world’s other industrialized economies.
This has been exacerbated by the lack of official international
liquidity, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has
imposed quantity adjustments on many developing countries
to safeguard fiscal surpluses. Many of these countries have
responded by undertaking policies to create external surpluses
and rising international reserves, thus ensuring that they will
not need external liquidity. 
Thus, the first steps in the reform process must be (1) to
offset the balance sheet losses caused by the collapse of asset
values and (2) to provide an alternative source of demand to
replace the U.S. consumer and an alternative source of finance
to counterbalance the deleveraging of financial institutions.
This can be done through traditional, countercyclical deficit
expenditure policies. To maximize their impact, these policies
must be implemented on a global scale; that is, both developed
and developing countries must introduce them. If developing
countries follow IMF advice and seek to shore up their finances
by running surpluses, this would simply reduce the impact of the
developed countries’ stimulus policies. But stimulus policies are
difficult for most developing countries, because additional liq-
uidity is required in order to finance their deficit expenditures. 
This leads to the necessity of an alternative financial facil-
ity in addition to those available from existing international
financial institutions, since the IMF discourages countries with
weak fiscal or external positions from participating in such
policies. One method of financing such a facility would be
through an additional SDR allocation. At the same time, coun-
tries with sufficient external reserves that adopted policies to
strengthen their external positions found that they attracted
additional external capital flows, which rapidly reversed as pri-
vate international financial institutions delevered, creating liquid-
ity shortages. Thus, the recommendation of the introduction of
SDRs is to provide liquidity for developing countries, in a way
similar to the “link” proposal introduced in discussions at the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in
1964, and to emerging market countries that may be adversely
affected by the rapid contraction in international flows. This
recommendation is very much in line with the original objective
of SDRs as providing additional liquidity in the absence of dol-
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It is also clear in the U.N. Commission’s report that the intro-
duction of SDRs or another global currency cannot resolve the
problemof the adjustment mechanism’s operation. Even the sim-
ple creation of a notional currency to be used in a clearing union
cannot do this without some commitment to coordinated sym-
metric adjustment by both surplus and deficit countries. This is
a function that was to have been undertaken by the IMF, under
its Article IV surveillance mandate, but which has been just as
asymmetric as the Bretton Woods system; it is only effective
where the IMF has the sanction of a lending program—that is,
in deficit countries. The Commission recommended that this
role be taken on by a proposed Global Economic Coordination
Council, to be formed at a political level that would guarantee
commitments to coordinated solutions. This council is an integral
part of the Commission’s reform proposals for the international
financial system, as it is the seat of the political commitment to
symmetric adjustment of international imbalances and thus the
locus of the stability of the international reserve currency’s pur-
chasing power. 
Two Additional Problems
This leaves two related problems. The first is that some develop-
ing countries may choose to adopt a development policy based
on net exports, which would be in direct contradiction to the
operation of an automatic or coordinated adjustment policy to
eliminate imbalances. Countries that choose this national devel-
opment strategy (as have many successful countries, such as
Japan, the newly industrialized countries, and others) can be
viewed either as lending resources to the rest of the world or as
borrowing effective demand from the rest of the world. The suc-
cessful pursuit of these policies will thus require a distortion of
prices, of exchange rates, or of the global distribution of demand.
The resulting surpluses and deficits will also have values that are
distorted and therefore cannot be guaranteed. They require not
only a coordinated policy to distribute surpluses and deficits
but also an appropriate allocation of the costs of this distribu-
tion, as well as the required liquidity provision to finance them.
The SDR may play a crucial role here as well, but as a provider
of liquidity rather than a guarantee of a stable store of interna-
tional value. Again, there is no automatic market mechanism to
bring this about.
The second problem concerns international capital flows.
As already mentioned, the original Bretton Woods proposal did
not envisage that such flows would play a substantial role either
in meeting payment imbalances or in the allocation of interna-
tional capital. The system has turned out to be rather different,
and private flows have been shown to be capable of creating
substantial distortions to the international adjustment mecha-
nism, abolishing limits to the size of imbalances and granting to
international investors the control of the adjustment mecha-
nism—which usually had operated through financial crisis
rather than smooth adjustment.  
If international adjustment is to be coordinated, either to
ensure the elimination of imbalances or to permit imbalances in
order to further the purposes of the national development strate-
gies of particular countries, management of capital flows will have
to be part of the coordination process. Thus, the Commission also
recommends that capital inflows be managed or controlled. This
management would in addition have a major impact on the sta-
bility of the purchasing power of whatever is used as the interna-
tional currency.
Thus, to sum up, the problem of the instability of the inter-
national reserve currency’s purchasing power is less a question
of the asset that serves as that currency and more a question of
the operation of the international adjustment mechanism, and
of whether that mechanism is automatic or coordinated, and
also sufficiently compatible with global aggregate demand to
provide full employment and support the national develop-
ment strategies of developing countries.
Note
1.  The preliminary version of the U.N. Commission’s report,
issued in May 2009, is available at www.un.org/ga/president/
63/interactive/financialcrisis/PreliminaryReport210509.pdf.